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The long second part of Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, the “Deter-
minate Religion,” constitutes his historical account of the religions of the world. The 
inordinate length of this section has caused many scholars to wonder why Hegel feels 
the need to give such a detailed analysis of the historical development of the different 
religions if his goal in the end is to make a case for the truth of Christianity. This has 
led to a degree of puzzlement about the “Determinate Religion” section. As a result, 
this section is not often treated in the secondary literature. Hegel developed his own 
approach to religion in large part in response to the views coming from the Enlight-
enment and Romanticism. He was highly critical of different aspects of these move-
ments, which he saw as undermining the truth of religion. In the present article I wish 
to examine his critical intuitions vis-à-vis these views. My proposal is that by seeing 
Hegel’s philosophy of religion as a response to the main trends of the Enlightenment 
and Romanticism, we can understand why he felt that he needed to spend so much 
time with the different world religions. 
 
Keywords:  G. W. F. Hegel – Enlightenment – Romanticism – Philosophy of religion – 
Christianity – World religions 
 
Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion consists of three parts, “The Concept 
of Religion,” the “Determinate Religion,” and the “Revealed Religion.” The second of 
these is by far the longest. It is here that Hegel goes through his historical account of the 
religions of the world. The inordinate length of this section has caused many scholars to 
wonder why Hegel feels the need to give such a detailed analysis of the historical devel-
opment of the different religions if his goal in the end is to make a case for the truth of 
Christianity. This has led to a degree of puzzlement about the “Determinate Religion” 
section. As a result, this section is not often treated in the secondary literature.  
Hegel developed his own approach to religion in large part in response to the views 
coming from the Enlightenment and Romanticism. He was highly critical of different 
aspects of these movements, which he saw as undermining the truth of religion. In the 
present article I wish to examine his critical intuitions vis-à-vis these views. The key will 
be to get straight about what he identifies as the principal errors of his day. In addition, 
we need to come to terms with his methodology for understanding the large cultural phe-
nomenon known as religion. We wish to explore, among other things, how he proposes to 
make a defense of Christianity by means of his method. My proposal is that by seeing 
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Hegel’s philosophy of religion as a response to the main trends of the Enlightenment and 
Romanticism, we can understand why he felt that he needed to spend so much time with 
the different world religions. 
 
1. The Conclusion of the Enlightenment: Ignorance of the Divine. The followers 
of the Enlightenment aimed to eliminate superstition by examining religion with the facul-
ty of critical reason. Knowledge was the result of an empirical investigation of the world, 
and it was impossible to demonstrate the existence of God in this way. The closest that 
one could come to this was the watchmaker argument, which seemed to give some empir-
ical evidence that there was a creator of the universe, but nothing more could be said 
about this entity. The result was that it was generally accepted among scholars that while 
God existed, He could not be known, and all claims to do so were regarded as based on 
fallacious reasoning.  
Hegel takes it to be a defining characteristic of his own day that there is great pride 
taken in the advances of the empirical sciences and the knowledge attained by them; here 
he is presumably thinking about things such as the invention of the microscope or the 
improvements of the telescope that opened up vast new spheres of human sense experi-
ence. Despite this richness of new empirical knowledge, it is equally a point of pride that 
it is claimed that nothing can be known about God. He formulates this somewhat para-
doxically as follows: “The more the knowledge of finite things has increased ‒ and the 
increase is so great that the extension of the sciences has become almost boundless, and 
all regions of knowledge are enlarged to an extent which makes a comprehensive view 
impossible ‒ so much the more has the sphere of the knowledge of God become contract-
ed. There was a time when all knowledge was knowledge of God. Our own time, on the 
contrary, has the distinction of knowing about all and everything about an infinite number 
of subjects but nothing at all of God.”
1
  
He takes this result to be an unhappy conjunction of certain philosophical theories, 
which lead to skepticism about God, and the view of empiricism, for which only evidence 
based on experience counts as demonstration. Hegel believes that it became a mark of the 
fashionable skeptical disposition during the Enlightenment to hold the view that nothing 
could be known about the divine. This showed that one was savvy to the critical spirit of 
the age. He explains, “It no longer gives our age a concern that it knows nothing of God; 
on the contrary, it is regarded as a mark of the highest intelligence to hold that such 
knowledge is not even possible.”
2
 The advocates of the Enlightenment thus look down on 
religious believers with condescension, regarding them as naïve, backward and supersti-
tious.  
 
                                                          
1 Hegel, Phil. of Religion, vol. 1, pp. 35-36; Jub., vol. 15, pp. 52-53. (Phil. of Religion = Lectures 
on the Philosophy of Religion, vols. 1-3, trans. by E.B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York: The Humanities Press 1962, 1968, 1972. Jub. = Sämtliche 
Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe, vols. 1-20, ed. by Hermann Glockner, Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag 
1928-41.) 
2 Hegel, Phil. of Religion, vol. 1, p. 36; Jub., vol. 15, p. 53.  
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But, for Hegel, the view of the Enlightenment is both confused and unchristian. He 
believes that Christianity commands one to know God, and on this point he takes his phi-
losophy to be in complete harmony with Christian doctrine: “What is laid down by the 
Christian religion as the supreme, absolute commandment, ‘Ye shall know God,’ is re-
garded as a piece of folly.”
3 One reads further, the current view of our ignorance of God is 
“directly opposed to the lofty nature of the Christian religion, for according to this we 
ought to know God, His nature, and His essential being, and to esteem this knowledge as 
something which is the highest of all.”
4
 In this context he also refers to Matthew 5:48 as 
evidence of his claim: “Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect.”
5
 Just as 
God knows, so also should humans know. 
Hegel’s central argument against the prevailing view is that a key feature of Christi-
anity is the revelation: God revealed Himself to human beings. Given this, it is difficult to 
understand, Hegel believes, how one can claim that He cannot be known. God revealed 
Himself precisely in order to be known: “In the Christian religion God has revealed Him-
self ‒ that is, he has given us to understand what he is; so that He is no longer a concealed 
or secret existence. And this possibility of knowing Him thus afforded us, renders such 
knowledge a duty. God wishes no narrow-hearted souls or empty heads for his children, 
but those whose spirit is of itself indeed, poor, but rich in the knowledge of Him; and who 
regard this knowledge of God as the only valuable possession.”
6
 
In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion Hegel traces the different forms of rev-
elation and hiddenness in the different world religions, and the fact that God reveals him-
self in Christ is perhaps the single most important point that makes Christianity what it is. 
God does not wish to remain hidden or unknown.
7
 The revelation is ample demonstration 
that God can in fact be known. Thus to say that we nonetheless can know nothing about 
   
                                                          
3 Hegel, Phil. of Religion, vol. 1, p. 36; Jub., vol. 15, p. 53.  
4 Hegel, Phil. of Religion, vol. 1, p. 37; Jub., vol. 15, p. 54. He also takes up this issue in his Lec-
tures on the Philosophy of History, where he argues, “…I have implicitly touched upon a prominent 
question of the day; namely, that the possibility of knowing God: or rather ‒ since public opinion has 
ceased to allow it to be a matter of question ‒ the doctrine that it is impossible to know God. In direct 
contravention of what is commanded in Holy Scripture as the highest duty ‒ that we should not merely 
love, but know God ‒ the prevalent dogma involves the denial of what is there said; namely, that it is the 
Spirit that leads into truth, knows all things, penetrates even into the deep things of the Godhead.” He-
gel, Phil. of Hist., p. 14; Jub., vol. 11, pp. 40-41. (Phil. of Hist = The Philosophy of History, trans. by J. 
Sibree, New York: Willey Book Co. 1944.) 
5 Hegel, Phil. of Religion, vol. 1, p. 36; Jub., vol. 15, p. 53.  
6 Hegel, Phil. of Hist., p. 15; Jub., vol. 11, p. 41. 
7 See Hegel, LPR, vol. 3, p. 246; VPR, Part 3, p. 175: “Philosophy knows God essentially as con-
crete, as the spiritual, realized universality that is not jealous but communicates itself. Even light com-
municates itself. Whoever says that God cannot be cognized is saying that God is jealous, and is not 
making a serious effort to achieve cognition when he speaks of God.” (LPR = Lectures on the Philoso-
phy of Religion, vols. 1-3, ed. by Peter C. Hodgson, trans. by Robert F. Brown, P.C. Hodgson and J.M. 
Stewart with the assistance of H.S. Harris, Berkeley et al.: University of California Press 1984-87. VPR 
= Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Parts 1-3, ed. by Walter Jaeschke, Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner 1983-85, 1993-95.) 
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him is absurd, when in fact we know rather a lot about the revelation of Christ in his life  
and teachings. 
But the problem is much broader than just one concerning the existence and nature 
of God; indeed, due to the criticisms of the Enlightenment Hegel believes that in the 
Protestant thinking of his day all of the traditional doctrines and dogmas of Christianity 
had been watered down, thinned out and for all intents and purposes abandoned. The 
critical eye of the Enlightenment thinkers has made belief in individual dogmas implausi-
ble. Again by requiring demonstration by means of empirical evidence alone, these think-
ers reduced the doctrines of religion to absurdity. Hegel believes that the theologians 
themselves are in large part responsible for this. Under the captivating spell of modern 
science, they have in the course of time implicitly relinquished one doctrine after another, 
capitulating to the criticisms of the sciences: “There are very few dogmas of the earlier 
system of Church confessions left which have any longer the importance formerly at-
tributed to them, and in their place no other dogmas have been set up. It is easy to con-
vince oneself, by considering what is the real value now attached to ecclesial dogmas, that 
into the religious world generally there has entered a widespread, almost universal indif-
ference towards what in earlier times were held to be essential doctrines of faith.”
8
 He 
goes on to mention a number of examples of doctrines which have fallen into discredit: 
the Trinity, the resurrection of the body, the divinity of Christ, eternal salvation, etc. 
Clear testimony to the fact that the traditional dogmas no longer carry any force of 
conviction is that fact that they are, according to Hegel, consigned to being a subject of 
purely historical study.
9
 In Protestant seminaries and faculties of theology students duti-
fully learn about the Church Councils and study the arguments that took place at them. 
But in this way the dogmas that are discussed are attributed to other people who lived in 
the past. They are thus not a part of the living religious belief of the moment. The issues 
are generally regarded as not being of any relevance in the present. If this is what theolo-
gy is about, then it is only concerned with the finite, that is, details of historical 
knowledge, and not with the infinite, that is, God. Although the theologians can make a 
show of great erudition in their detailed knowledge of the Church Councils, they know 
 
                                                          
8 Hegel, Phil. of Religion, vol. 1, p. 38; Jub., vol. 15, p. 55. See also Phil. of Religion, vol. 1, p. 
39; Jub., vol. 15, p. 56: “…the weighty doctrines of the Trinity, of the resurrection of the body, as also 
the miracles in the Old and New Testaments, are neglected as matters of indifference, and have lost their 
importance. The divinity of Christ, dogma, what is particular to the Christian religion is set aside, or else 
reduced to something of merely general nature.” See also Phil. of Mind, § 445, Addition; Jub., vol. 10, p. 
312: “For although even those theologians who declare God to be unknowable go to a great deal of 
trouble exegetical, critical, and historical about him and in this way expand theology into a complex 
detailed science, yet in their hands the science gets no further than a knowledge of externals, for they 
throw out the substantial content of their subject matter as indigestible by their weak minds and accord-
ingly renounce all claim to a cognition of God, since, as we have said, a knowledge of externals does not 
suffice for cognition, which requires a grasp of the substantial, specific nature of the subject matter.” 
(Phil. of Mind = Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, trans. by William Wallace and A.V. Miller, Oxford: Clar-
endon Press 1971.) 
9 Hegel, Phil. of Religion, vol. 1, pp. 40-42; Jub., vol. 15, pp. 57-59.  
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nothing of God. In this sense Hegel sees theology in his own day as having betrayed its  
very office. 
The result of the criticism of the advocates of the Enlightenment is a reduction of the 
content of religion. Nothing determinate can be known about God or the key dogmas. 
Hegel explicitly compares the Enlightenment with what he regards as genuine philosophy 
on this point concerning the correct conception of religion: “The…opposition is between 
philosophy and the Enlightenment. Philosophy is opposed to the attitude of indifference 
toward the content; it is opposed to mere opinion, to the despair involved in its renuncia-
tion of the truth, and to the view that it does not matter what content is intended. The goal 
of philosophy is the cognition of the truth ‒ the cognition of God because he is the abso-
lute truth…The Enlightenment ‒ that vanity of understanding ‒ is the most vehement 
opponent of philosophy. It takes it very ill when philosophy demonstrates the rational 
content in the Christian religion, when it shows that the witness of the Spirit, the truth in 
the most all-embracing sense of the term is deposited in religion.”
10
 While the Enlighten-
ment empties religion of its content, philosophy tries to understand it by grasping the 
rational element in this content.  
Controversially, Hegel claims that the function that philosophy can serve is to save 
religion from the neglect by the theologians. It can restore knowledge of God and the 
traditional dogmas and thereby put religion back onto a firm footing: “it is philosophy 
which is the liberation of the spirit from that shameful degradation, and which has once 
more brought religion out of the stage of intense suffering which it had to experience 
when occupying the standpoint referred to.”
11
 Philosophy must come to the rescue of 
religion to defend it from its ostensible defenders, the theologians: “the fact is that in 
recent times philosophy has been obliged to defend the domain of religion against the 
attacks of several theological systems.”
12
 This is a highly provocative claim that surely 
irritated many theologians. But, indeed, Hegel makes it an overt point on his agenda to 
restore the lost doctrines for theology.
13
  
 
2. The Conclusion of Romanticism: The Split between Thinking and Feeling. 
Since, according to the advocates of the Enlightenment, God could not be demonstrated 
by empirical evidence and scientific reasoning, this led thinkers of the Romantic move-
ment to the conclusion that everything having to do with the divine and religion belonged 
to the realm of subjectivity, inwardness and feeling. Nothing outwardly could be demon-
strated in the objective sphere, and so, it was thought, the realm of religion must belong to 
the inward, subjective sphere. This leads to the view, still quite widespread today, that it is 
impossible to discuss religion or to argue for or against the existence of God since these 
are inward matters of the heart that cannot be demonstrated objectively or discursively. 
                                                          
10 Hegel, LPR, vol. 3, pp. 246f.; VPR, Part 3, p. 175. 
11 Hegel, Phil. of Religion, vol. 1, p. 37; Jub., vol. 15, p. 54.  
12 Hegel, Phil. of Hist., p. 15; Jub., vol. 11, p. 41. 
13 Hegel, Phil. of Religion, vol. 1, p. 32; Jub., vol. 15, p. 49: “Indeed, the re-establishment of the 
doctrines of the Church, which have been reduced to a minimum by the understanding, is…the work of 
philosophy.” 
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Therefore, there opened up a radical split between thinking and feeling. The realm of 
science and discursive rationality was that of thought, which was concerned with objec-
tive things, whereas the realm of religion was that of feeling or inward subjectivity. Hegel 
regards this as another disastrous feature of contemporary thinking. 
As a dialectical thinker, Hegel strongly opposes the radical division between thought 
and feeling. His initial intuition is the idealist claim that thinking is at the heart of the 
different human spheres of activity. The arts, the sciences, legal systems and governments 
are all the products of the collective human mind or “spirit.” They develop in different 
contexts in different places through the centuries. In the course of this development, they 
take on different characteristics and shapes. Religion constitutes an aspect of human cul-
ture as well. Like the other spheres of spirit, it too develops in the different peoples and 
places through time. Like the other spheres of spirit, it can also be made the object of 
study and knowledge. Human beings are characterized by “spirit,” and every sphere of 
their lives is permeated by it: “it is through thought, concrete thought, or, to put it more 
definitely, it is by reason of his being spirit, that man is man; and from man as spirit pro-
ceed all the many developments of the sciences and arts, the interests of political life, and 
all those conditions which have reference to man’s freedom and will.”
14
  
Hegel is quick to reject the view that religion is concerned with some unique or spe-
cial faculty, for example, feeling or immediate knowing, whereas philosophy is concerned 
with thought. In the Encyclopedia, he refers to “the prejudice of our day and age, which 
separates feeling and thinking from each other in such a way that they are supposedly 
opposed to each other, and are even so hostile that feeling ‒ religious feeling in particular 
‒ is contaminated, perverted, or even totally destroyed by thinking, and that religion and 
religiosity essentially do not have their root and their place in thinking.”
15
 According to 
the Romantic account, it is human feeling which is regarded as the most important ele-
ment of the individual. Hegel attempts to refute this view of the split between faith and 
reason as follows: “Making a separation of this kind means forgetting that only man is 
capable of religion, and that the lower animals have no religion, any more than right and 
morality belong to them….Religion, right, and ethical life belong to man alone, and that 
only because he is a thinking essence. For that reason thinking in its broad sense has not 
been inactive in these spheres, even at the level of feeling and belief or of representation; 
the activity and productions of thinking are present in them and are included in them.”
16
 
                                                          
14 Hegel, Phil. of Religion, vol. 1, pp. 1f.; Jub., vol. 15, p. 19.  
15 Hegel, EL, § 2; Jub., vol. 8, p. 42. (EL = The Encyclopaedia Logic. Part One of the Encyclopae-
dia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. by T.F. Gerats, W.A. Suchting, H.S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett  
1991.) 
16 Hegel, EL, § 2; Jub., vol. 8, pp. 42f. For Hegel’s critical discussion of the split between faith and 
knowledge, see also his “Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im Verhältnisse zur christlichen 
Glaubenserkenntniss. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnisse der Philosophie unserer Zeit. Von Carl Friederich G…..l 
‒ Berlin, bei E. Franklin. 1829,” Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, 1829, nos. 99-102, pp. 789-816; 
nos. 105-106, pp. 833-835; see pp. 813f. Reprinted in Vermischte Schriften, vols. 1-2, ed. by Friedrich 
Förster and Ludwig Boumann, vols. 16-17 (1834-35) in Hegel’s Werke, vol. 17, pp. 111-148, see pp. 
141f. (In English as “Review of K.F. Göschel’s Aphorisms,” trans. by Clark Butler in MW, pp. 401-429, 
see pp. 423ff.; Jub., vol. 20, pp. 276-313, see pp. 306f.) (Hegel’s Werke = Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
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Religion belongs uniquely to human beings, and from this it follows that it must imply the 
cognitive faculty unique to human beings: thought. One recalls Hegel’s famous criticism 
of Schleiermacher for making feeling the organ of religious faith. This is also relevant for 
Hegel’s criticism of Jacobi’s view of a precognitive immediate knowing that is different 
from our usual ways of knowing. 
Hegel further argues that the misunderstanding arises from the fact that when people 
hear the claim that religion, right and ethics are essentially concerned with thought, they 
mistakenly take it to mean that conscious reflection is always at work in these different 
spheres. Instead, Hegel’s thesis is that a necessary logos or reason is always present and 
developing in these different contexts, regardless of how reflective particular individuals 
may or may not be. The rich content of religion is contained in the spirit of a people. Here 
Hegel is paradoxically in agreement with the Romantics who were interested in reviving a 
national German spirit by studying German folk songs, folk tales and fairy tales, which 
they regarded as reflecting the common cultural heritage of the German people. But at the 
same time he is vehemently opposed to their reduction of all religious content to the realm 
of subjectivity. 
 
3. The Problem of Content. The negative result to which the Romantic emphasis on 
feeling leads is the elimination of any concrete content in faith. This is something that 
Romanticism has in common with the Enlightenment. For the advocates of the Enlight-
enment it was the inability of religion to defend itself in terms of science that led to the 
elimination of its key doctrines and ended in a position of skepticism or agnosticism. For 
Romanticism, the focus on feeling and the individual eliminated the objective content of 
religion and transferred everything to the sphere of personal feeling, inwardness and sub-
jectivity. Since feeling can be related to any kind of content, there is nothing specifically 
to attach it to the faith of the Christian religion. In the foreword to the third edition of the 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in 1830 Hegel argues that when one makes 
feeling the criterion, the relation of faith becomes a purely formal one. He explains, peo-
ple with this mistaken conception “busy themselves at great length with a mass of indif-
ferent external matters of the faith; but then in contrast they stand by the name of the Lord 
Christ in a completely barren fashion as far as the basic import and intellectual content of 
the faith itself is concerned; and they deliberately and scornfully disdain the elaboration of 
doctrine that is the foundation of the faith of the Christian church. For the spiritual, fully 
thoughtful, and scientific expansion [of the doctrine] would upset, and even forbid or 
wipe out, the self-conceit of their boasting which relies on the spiritless and fruitless as-
surance…that they are in possession of Christianity, and have it exclusively for their 
own.”
17
 It is clear that if religion is to make any sense it must contain a concrete content 
                                                          
Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1-18, ed. by Ludwig Boumann, Friedrich Förster, Eduard 
Gans, Karl Hegel, Leopold von Henning, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Philipp Marheineke, Karl Ludwig 
Michelet, Karl Rosenkranz, Johannes Schulze. Berlin: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot 1832-45. MW 
= Miscellaneous Writings of G.W.F. Hegel, ed. by Jon Stewart, Evanston: Northwestern University Press 
2002.) 
17 Hegel, EL, p. 20; Jub., vol. 8, p. 27. 
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that is accessible to everyone. It cannot be the private, exclusive domain of specific indi-
viduals to the exclusion of others. Hegel describes this mistaken view as “the subjectivity 
of knowledge” which “entrenches itself as in an inaccessible place.”
18
 
Hegel is interested in making a case not just for religion in general but for Christiani-
ty in particular. For Christianity to be a specific religion, he reasons, it must have a deter-
minate content. This content is determined by its conception of God and its dogmas, 
which are objectively accessible. If it lacks this content, then an ostensible belief in Chris-
tianity could in effect be a belief in anything at all. Hegel explains this while criticizing 
what he takes to be a mistaken “philosophizing” view of his own age that he associates with 
Jacobi and some of the German Romantics: “The Christian faith implies an authority that 
belongs to the church, while, on the contrary, the faith of this philosophizing standpoint is 
just the authority of one’s own subjective revelation. Moreover, the Christian faith is an 
objective content that is inwardly rich, a system of doctrine and cognition; whereas the 
content of this [philosophical] faith is inwardly so indeterminate that it may perhaps admit 
that content too ‒ but equally it may embrace within it the belief that the Dalaï-Lama, the 
bull, the ape, etc., is God, or it may, for its own part, restrict itself to God in general, to 
the ‘highest essence.’”
19
 
With these examples it is clear that content is not an indifferent part of a religion. 
The content is precisely what defines the individual religions and separates and distin-
guishes them from one another. Simply by saying that one believes is not enough to de-
termine one’s confession. But this content is precisely the proof that belief is a matter of 
knowledge. One must know the content of one’s belief in order to distinguish it from oth-
er beliefs. 
The lack of content leads to another problem. If God cannot be known and there is 
no concrete content given from the outside, then it is only natural that this will get filled 
up from the inside, namely, by some subjective notion that is idiosyncratic to the individ-
ual. Hegel explains, “While the divine being is thus placed beyond our knowledge, and 
outside the limit of all human things, we have the convenient license of wandering as far 
as we list, in the direction of our fancies. We are freed from the obligation to refer our 
knowledge to the divine and true. On the other hand, the vanity and egotism which char-
acterize it, find, in this false position, ample justification; and the pious modesty which 
puts far from it the knowledge of God, can well estimate how much furtherance thereby 
accrues to its own wayward and vain strivings.”
20
 With no concrete content to determine 
or restrain action, the door is open for religious fanaticism to believe the most far-fetched 
things and even to carry out extreme acts in the name of religion.
21
 
Hegel is critical of this view since, he believes, it leads to a form of relativism. There 
                                                          
18 Hegel, Phil. of Religion, vol. 3, p. 174; Jub., vol. 16, p. 379. 
19 Hegel, EL, § 63; Jub., vol. 8, p. 168. 
20 Hegel, Phil. of Hist., p. 14; Jub., vol. 11, p. 41. 
21 In the Philosophy of Right Hegel defines evil as the disregard for the objective and the universal 
and giving priority to the arbitrariness of one’s own particularity. See PR, § 139; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 200-
204. (PR = Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H.B. Nisbet, ed. by Allen Wood, Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.) 
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is no objective standard for truth or knowledge of the divine, according to this conception, 
since the locus of truth is found in the heart of each individual. Hegel explains, “For with 
the thought that all objective determinateness has converged in the inwardness of subjec-
tivity, the conviction is bound up that God gives revelation in an immediate way to man; 
that religion consists just in this, that man has immediate knowledge of God.”
22
 Since this 
knowledge is immediate, it gives the individual a special and irreplaceable role.  
According to Hegel, the consent of the individual and conscience is a key feature of 
the modern world. In ancient cultures the individual or subjectivity was not recognized as 
being valid with respect to questions of morals, laws, customs, etc. Instead, it was the 
established objective sphere of such things which ruled with an iron hand. If accepted 
custom or law dictated that one do something, for example, take up the profession of 
one’s father or marry someone that one’s family has selected, then one did it, and one’s 
own personal wishes and desires played no role in the situation. The individual did not 
count for much. For Hegel, it is a great breakthrough in the development of spirit that in 
the modern world the validity of the individual has come to be recognized. Today we 
believe that the assent of the individual is necessary for belief, and it is wrong to compel 
or coerce someone to do something against his or her will or conscience. The individual is 
now thought to be able to evaluate a given law, custom or belief and grant his assent if it 
is rational. To this extent Hegel is in agreement with the fundamental intuition of Roman-
ticism about the subject. However, assent is directed toward something with a concrete 
content. There is an objective content external to the individual that one must take a stand 
on. We give our assent when we realize that that content is rational and thus in accord-
ance with our rational will. With education and proper upbringing, one naturally comes to 
see the truth and rationality of this objective sphere, and when one reaches the age of 
reflection and contemplates such things for oneself, then one gives one’s assent to them 
and complies with them. In this sense the right of the individual is recognized. It is the 
second aspect that, according to Hegel, the Romantics have failed to understand since 
they have eliminated all objective content. Assent or conscience only makes sense when it 
is related to something concrete with a determinate content. But when assent itself be-
comes the key, independent of any content, a number of problems arise.  
The conception of individuality and conscience that one finds in the Romantics falls 
victim to these. The Romantics do not recognize the preexisting objective sphere of cus-
toms and ethics; instead, they place the entire focus on the individual’s will and free 
choice. But this is empty of content and leads to arbitrariness. Instead of taking its truth 
from the objective sphere outside itself, the individual props himself up as the standard 
for truth and objectivity. For Hegel, this is a perversion of the modern principle of subjec-
tive freedom. 
 
4. Hegel’s Solution. Hegel’s account of the determinate religions has long puzzled 
scholars since it is not immediately clear why he believes that he needs to give a detailed 
analysis of the history of the world’s religions, many of which are little known to most 
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philosophers. The answer lies in the issue of content. Since Hegel insists that content is an 
essential part of religion for all the reasons just discussed, it is important for him to exam-
ine the specific content in the different world religions in order to demonstrate that there 
is a historical development taking place. Only when one can discern accurately the con-
tent of the different forms of religious belief is it possible to see how the human mind, 
reflected in them is slowly progressing towards human freedom.  
Each of the world religions is unique and has its own special set of beliefs and prac-
tices, i.e., its content. Thus in his analyses Hegel attempts to characterize each of the reli-
gions in terms of some prominent, distinguishing feature unique to them. One can see 
Hegel’s negative response to the lack of religious content in the views of the religious 
movements of his time as an important motivating factor for the development of the anal-
ysis of the determinate religions. This is Hegel’s way of demonstrating beyond any doubt 
that all religions have a determinate content and that it is absolutely essential to under-
stand this if one is to grasp the nature of religion generally or the truth of Christianity 
specifically.  
With the philosophy of the Enlightenment it is claimed that we cannot know the 
truth or God. Thus faith is divorced from any form of knowledge. In Romanticism faith 
then became conceived as a form of immediate knowledge or feeling in contrast to scien-
tific knowledge, which is deemed impotent.
23
 For this reason Hegel frequently criticizes 
the then current situation of religion along the same lines as he criticizes what he regards 
as contemporary relativism and nihilism. The goal of Hegel’s lectures is to correct these 
misunderstandings and restore the traditional doctrines of Christianity. He believes that 
the only way to do this is with a historical analysis of the religions of the world. 
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